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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence shows that macroeconomic fundamentals have little explanatory power for
nominal exchange rates. On the other hand, the recent ``microstructure approach to exchange rates''
has shown that most exchange rate volatility at short to medium horizons is related to order flows.
This suggests that investor heterogeneity might be key to understanding exchange rate dynamics,
in contrast to the common representative agent approach in macroeconomic models of exchange rate
determination. To explore this issue, we introduce investor heterogeneity into an otherwise standard
monetary model of exchange rate determination. There are two types of heterogeneity: dispersed
information about fundamentals and non-fundamentals based heterogeneity (e.g., liquidity traders).
We show that information dispersion leads to magnification and endogenous persistence of the
impact of non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate, both resulting from rational confusion about
the source of exchange rate fluctuations. Higher order expectations, familiar from Keynes' ``beauty
contest'', partly contribute to these results. The implications of the model are consistent with the
evidence on the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals: (i)fundamentals play little
role in explaining exchange rate movements in the short to medium run, (ii) over longer horizons
the exchange rate is primarily driven by fundamentals, (iii) exchange rate changes are a weak
predictor of future fundamentals.
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The enormous volume of trade in the foreign exchange market, $1.2 trillion per
day in 2001, reﬂects extensive heterogeneity among market participants. More-
over, recent evidence from the microstructure approach to exchange rates suggests
that investor heterogeneity is not a sideshow, but a critical driving force behind
exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In particular, Evans and Lyons [2001] show that most
short-run exchange rate volatility is related to order ﬂow, which in turn is asso-
ciated with investor heterogeneity.1 On the other hand, existing macroeconomic
models of exchange rate determination, in which there is no role for investor het-
erogeneity, have fared poorly. Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983] found that a random walk
predicts exchange rates better than macroeconomic models. Their ﬁndings remain
valid today.2 Lyons [2001] refers to the weak explanatory power of macroeconomic
fundamentals as the “exchange rate determination puzzle” and characterizes ex-
change rate economics as in a state of crisis.3 A natural question is whether investor
heterogeneity can explain this puzzle.
The goal of this paper is to examine the impact of investor heterogeneity on
exchange rate behavior. In order to do so in a way that is most transparent,
we introduce investor heterogeneity into a standard monetary model of exchange
rate determination. We introduce two types of heterogeneity that have generally
been associated with order ﬂow. The ﬁrst type is heterogeneous information of
market participants about future macroeconomic fundamentals. We know from
extensive survey evidence that investors have diﬀerent views about the macroeco-
nomic outlook.4 T h es e c o n dt y p ei sn o n - f u n d a m e n t a ls based heterogeneity. This
includes noise traders, but more generally involves rational investors who trade
1See also Rime [2001] and Froot and Ramadorai [2002].
2More recently Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual [2002] consider a much wider range of models than
originally considered by Meese and Rogoﬀ and ﬁnd that none of them consistently outperforms
the random walk in predictive power. For a survey see Frankel and Rose [1995].
3The exchange rate determination puzzle is part of a broader set of exchange rate puzzles that
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [2001] have called the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. This also includes
the lack of feedback from the exchange rate to the macro economy and the excess volatility of
exchange rates (relative to fundamentals).
4There is also evidence that exchange rate expectations diﬀer substantially across investors.
See Chionis and MacDonald [2002], Ito [1990], Elliott and Ito [1999], and MacDonald and Marsh
[1996].
1for non-speculative reasons. Examples are liquidity traders, trades resulting from
hedging idiosyncratic endowment or preference shocks, or trades associated with
diﬀerential access to private investment opportunities.5 Some recent papers have
introduced the second type of heterogeneity into models of exchange rate determi-
nation, mostly in the form of noise traders, but they do not consider information
dispersion.6 We will show that it is the interaction of these two types of hetero-
geneity that helps in understanding the exchange rate determination puzzle.
Our model is in the tradition of the noisy rational expectations literature, in
which both types of heterogeneity are present.7 In that literature asset prices are an
important source of information for investors as they aggregate private information
of individual investors. Noise reduces the information content of asset prices, but
is necessary for a rational expectations equilibrium to exist.8 Most noisy rational
expectations models are static or two-period models. This makes them ill-suited
to address the disconnect between asset prices and fundamentals, which is much
stronger in the long-run than the short-run (e.g. Mark [1995] for exchange rates).
The problem with solving dynamic noisy rational expectations models with
heterogeneous information is what Townsend [1983] called “inﬁnite regress”. As-
set prices depend on higher order expectations of fundamentals: expectations of
other investors’ expectations, expectations of expectations of other investors’ ex-
pectations, and so on. The dimension of these higher order expectations increases
with the horizon, leading to inﬁnite regress for an inﬁnite horizon model. This is
not a mere technical nuisance. Keynes [1936] compared investment decisions to a
beauty contest, where “... each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he
himself ﬁnds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the
other competitors...”. In Keynes’ view the market is very much driven by opinions
of other investors’ opinions, and even higher order than that.
5See respectively Dow and Gorton [1995], Spiegel and Subrahmanyam [1992] and Wang [1994].
6Examples are Jeanne and Rose [2002], Devereux and Engel [2002], Kollman [2002], and Mark
and Wu [1998]. Hau and Rey [2002] introduce non-fundamentals based heterogeneity through
an exogenous foreign exchange supply function of banks.
7Three inﬂuential papers that jump-started this literature are Grossman and Stiglitz [1980],
Hellwig [1980] and Diamond and Verrecchia [1981]. For an overview, see Brunnermeier [2001].
8Without non-fundamentals noise the asset price fully reveals the aggregate information of
all investors, so that they have no incentive to collect private information or to use it once they
have collected it.
2There is a small literature that has studied dynamic noisy rational expectations
models. He and Wang [1995] assume that an asset has one payoﬀ at a terminal
date. A continuous time version of that model has inﬁnite regress, but an analytical
solution is nonetheless feasible. However, the one-time payoﬀ structure is less appli-
cable to the foreign exchange market. Another approach is found in Wang [1993,
1994], who adopts a hierarchical information structure suggested by Townsend
[1983]. A set of agents is fully informed, while another set of agents is uninformed.
In that case higher order expectations collapse to ﬁrst order expectations.9 Fi-
nally, Townsend [1983] develops a solution method for a model with symmetrically
dispersed information.10 Townsend studies a dynamic business cycle model rather
than an asset-pricing model. Subsequent contributions have been mostly techni-
cal, solving the same model as in Townsend [1983] with alternative methods.11
The only application to asset pricing we are aware of is Singleton [1987], who
applies Townsend’s method to a model for government bonds with a symmetric
information structure.12
In this paper we adopt Townsend’s symmetric information structure. This has
two advantages over a hierarchical information structure. First, it allows us to
focus on information dispersion itself rather than diﬀerences in the quality of in-
formation across investors. Second, when information is symmetrically dispersed,
9The expectation of a fundamental by an informed investor is the fundamental itself, so that
t h ee x p e c t a t i o nb ya nu n i n f o r m e di n v e s t o ro ft h ee x p e c t a t i o no fa ni n f o r m e di n v e s t o ri se q u a lt o
the ﬁrst order expectation of the uninformed investor.
10The solution method described in Townsend [1983] applies to the model in section 8 of that
paper where the economy-wide average price is observed with noise. Townsend [1983] mistakenly
believed that higher order expectations are also relevant in a two-sector version of the model
where ﬁrms observe each other’s prices without noise. However, Pearlman and Sargent [2002]
show that the equilibrium fully reveals private information in that case.
11See Kasa [2000] and Sargent [1991]. Probably as a result of the technical diﬃculty in solving
these models, the macroeconomics literature has devoted relatively little attention to heteroge-
neous information in the last two decades. This contrasts with the 1970s where, following Lucas
[1972], there had been active research on rational expectations and heterogeneous information
(e.g., see King, 1982). Recently, information issues in the context of price rigidity have again
been brought to the forefront in contributions by Woodford [2001] and Mankiw and Reis [2002].
12In Singleton’s model there is no information dispersion about the payoﬀ structure on the
assets (in this case coupons on government bonds), but there is private information about whether
non-fundamentals based trade (the noise) is transitory or persistent. The uncertainty is resolved
after two periods.
3higher order expectations play an important role. In solving the model we adopt
two alternative approaches. The ﬁrst is Townsend’s solution method. This gives
an exact solution, but it can only be applied to asset pricing models with over-
lapping two-period lived investors (as in Singleton [1987]). The second approach
is a close numerical approximation that we develop for the solution of the model
with inﬁnitely lived agents. This leads to almost identical results as applying the
Townsend method to the case of two-period lived investors.
Introducing information heterogeneity helps in understanding the exchange rate
determination puzzle along three dimensions. First, we show that a small amount
of non-fundamentals based trade can become the dominant source of exchange rate
volatility when information is heterogeneous, while it has practically no eﬀect on
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ew h e ni n v e s t o r sh a v ec o mmon information. The reason is that
under heterogeneous information the exchange rate itself becomes an important
source of information about future fundamentals. The impact of non-fundamentals
trade on the exchange rate can then be signiﬁcantly ampliﬁed as agents rationally
misinterpret the resulting exchange rate movements as information about future
fundamentals.13 Moreover, as Allen, Morris and Shin [2003] have shown, asset
prices are more sensitive to public information when they depend on higher or-
d e re x p e c t a t i o n s .I nt h i sp a p e rw es h o wt h a th i g h e ro r d e re x p e c t a t i o n sg i v em o r e
weight to the exchange rate as a source of information, contributing to the mag-
niﬁcation of the impact of non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate.
Second, the resulting rational confusion can be persistent, which generates
endogenous persistence of the impact of non-fundamentals based trade on the
exchange rate. Finally, consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Mark [1995]),
the exchange rate is largely driven by fundamentals in the long run. As agents
gradually learn about future fundamentals, and even observe them as time goes
on, the rational confusion eventually dissipates.14
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
13In the context of static models, several authors, e.g., Gennotte and Leland [1990] and Romer
[1993], argued that such rational confusion played a critical role in amplifying non-informational
trade during the stock-market crash of October 19, 1987.
14Another recent paper on exchange rate dynamics where learning plays an important role is
Gourinchas and Tornell [2002]. In that paper, in which there is no investor heterogeneity, agents
learn about the nature of interest rate shocks (transitory or persistent), but there is an irrational
misperception about the second moments in interest rate forecasts that never goes away.
4model and solution method. Section III considers some special cases of the model
in order to develop intuition for our key results. Section IV presents the results
based on the general dynamic model and Section V concludes.
II A Monetary Model with Information Disper-
sion
II.A Inﬁnite Regress
Our model contains the three basic building blocks of the standard monetary
model of exchange rate determination: (i) money market equilibrium, (ii) pur-
chasing power parity, and (iii) interest rate parity. We modify the standard
monetary model in two ways. First, we introduce non-fundamentals based trade,
which aﬀects the risk-premium in the interest parity condition. We model non-
fundamentals trade in the form of noise traders, both because this is the easiest
way to do it and because it has become a relatively standard way to model non-
fundamentals trade in open economy macroeconomics. As emphasized in the intro-
duction though, non-fundamentals based trade can be modeled in many ways and
in general can be perfectly rational. We do not believe that our particular way of
modeling it here is critical to the results.15 Second, we assume that investors have
heterogeneous expectations about future fundamentals. Before describing the pre-
cise information structure, we ﬁrst derive a general solution to the exchange rate
under heterogeneous information, in which the exchange rate depends on higher
order expectations of future fundamentals. This generalizes the standard equilib-
rium exchange rate equation that depends on (common) expectations of future
fundamentals.
There are two economies. They produce the same good, so that purchasing
power parity holds:
pt = p
∗
t + st (1)
Local currency prices are in logs and st is the log of the nominal exchange rate.16
15For example, the model in Wang [1993] is very similar to that in Wang [1994]. In the former
the non-fundamentals trade is exogenous, while in the latter it is generated endogenously by
giving some investors access to private investment opportunities.
16This assumption is relaxed in section IV.C when we introduce price stickiness.
5There is a continuum of investors in both countries on the interval [0,1]. We
assume that there are overlapping generations of agents that live for two periods
and make only one investment decision. This assumption signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes
the presentation, helps in providing intuition, and allows us to obtain an exact
solution to the model. However, it is not critical for the results and we discuss
below the case where agents have inﬁnite horizons.
Investors in both economies can invest in four assets: domestic money, nominal
bonds of both countries with interest rates it and i∗
t, and a technology with ﬁxed
real return r that is in inﬁnite supply. We assume that one economy is large
and the other inﬁnitesimally small. Bond market equilibrium is therefore entirely
determined by investors in the large country, on which we will focus. We also
assume that money supply in the large country is constant, which in equilibrium
leads to a constant price level pt, so that we can focus on nominal returns and
it = r. Money supply in the small country is stochastic.
The wealth wi
t of investors born at time t is given by a ﬁxed endowment. At
time t+1 these investors receive the return on their investments plus income from
time t+1 production. We assume that production depends on real money holdings
f mi
t through the function f(f mi
t)=k − f mi
t(ln(f mi
t) − 1)/α.17 Agent i maximizes
−Ete
−γci
t+1
subject to
c
i
t+1 =( 1+it)w
i
t +( st+1 − st + i
∗
t − it)b
i
t − itf m
i
t + f(f m
i
t)
where wi
t is real wealth at the start of period t,a n dbi
t is invested in foreign bonds.
st+1 − st + i∗
t − it is the log-linearized excess return on investing abroad.
Combining the ﬁrst order condition for money holdings with money market
equilibrium in both countries we get
mt − pt = −αit (2)
m
∗
t − p
∗
t = −αi
∗
t (3)
where mt,a n dm∗
t are the logs of domestic and foreign nominal money supply.18
17By introducing money through production rather than utility we avoid making money de-
mand a function of consumption, which would complicate the solution.
18It is immediately clear that the equilibrium price level in the large country is constant since
it = r is constant and the money supply is constant.
6The demand for foreign bonds by investor i is:
b
i
t =
Ei
t(st+1) − st + i∗
t − it
γσ2
t
(4)
where Ei
t(st+1) is the expectation of investor i.
We assume that a proportion n of investors have a noisy expected return. More
speciﬁcally, investors on the interval [0,1−n]h a v er a t i o n a le x p e c t a t i o n sa b o u tt h e
excess return on foreign bonds, while investors on the interval [1 − n,1] have an
error term χt added to the rational expectation. As is standard, we assume that
vart(st+1)=σ2
t is rational for all traders. The net supply of foreign bonds resulting
from the expectational error is given by bt ≡− nχt/γσ2
t.W ea s s u m et h a tbt follows
an AR(1) process:
bt = ρbbt−1 + ε
b
t (5)
where εb
t ∼ N(0,σ2
b). A critical assumption is that bt is not observable.19 Only the
p r o c e s si sk n o w nt oa l la g e n t s .
Since bonds are in zero net supply, aggregation of (4) yields the following
interest arbitrage condition:
Et(st+1) − st = it − i
∗
t + γbtσ
2
t (6)
where Et is the average rational expectation across all investors. For noise traders
it only includes the rational component of their expectation.
The model is summarized by (1), (2), (3), and (6). Other than the risk-premium
in the interest rate parity condition associated with non-fundamentals trade, these
equations are the standard building blocks of the monetary model of exchange rate
determination.
Deﬁning the fundamental as ft =( mt − m∗
t), in Appendix A we derive the
following equilibrium exchange rate:
st =
1
1+α
∞ X
k=0
µ α
1+α
¶k
E
k
t
³
ft+k − αγσ
2
t+kbt+k
´
(7)
where E
0
t(xt)=xt, E
1
t(xt+1)=Et(xt+1) and higher order expectations are deﬁned
as
E
k
t(xt+k)=EtEt+1...Et+k−1(xt+k). (8)
19This is even the case for the irrational agents. Otherwise they would know their own expec-
tational error.
7Thus, the exchange rate at time t depends on the fundamental at time t,
the average expectation of the fundamental at time t + 1, the average expec-
tation of the average expectation of the fundamental at t +2 , e t c . T h el a w
of iterated expectations does not apply to average expectations. For example,
EtEt+1(st+2) 6= Et(st+2).20 This is a basic feature of asset-pricing under heteroge-
neous expectations: the expectation of other investors’ expectations matters. In a
dynamic system, this leads to the inﬁnite regress problem, as analyzed in Townsend
[1983]: as the horizon goes to inﬁnity the dimensionality of the expectation term
goes to inﬁnity.
II.B The Information Structure
We assume that investors receive a signal at time t about the fundamental at
t + T. We will compare the results under common knowledge, where all investors
receive the same signal, to that under private (heterogeneous) information, where
investors receive diﬀerent signals. We deﬁne the fundamental T periods from now
as
ut = ft+T
With common knowledge all investors receive the signal
vt = ut + ε
v
t ε
v
t ∼ N(0,σ
2
v,c)( 9 )
where εv
t is independent of ut. Under heterogeneous information investor i receives
as i g n a l
v
i
t = ut + ε
vi
t ε
vi
t ∼ N(0,σ
2
v)( 1 0 )
where εvi
t is independent from ut and other agents’ signals. Due to the law of large
numbers, the average signal received by investors is ut,i . e . ,
R 1
0 vi
tdi = ut.
We assume that the fundamental’s process is always common knowledge to all
agents:
ut = ρ1ut−1 + ρ2ut−2 + ε
u
t ε
u
t ∼ N(0,σ
2
u)( 1 1 )
Since investors observe current and lagged values of the fundamental, knowing the
process provides information about the fundamental at future dates. The main
20This point is developed further below. See also Allen, Morris, and Shin [2002] for a discussion
in a simpler setting.
8results of the paper, reported in section IV, are based on the assumption that
ρ1 =1+ρ and ρ2 = −ρ, so that the fundamental follows an AR process in ﬁrst
diﬀerences: ut−ut−1 = ρ(ut−1−ut−2)+εu
t.W ew i l lt a k eu pt h em u c hs i m p l e rc a s e
where ρ1 = ρ2 =0i nt h en e x ts e c t i o n .
II.C Solution Methods
The model only has an analytical solution for the special case where T =1 ,w h i c h
is discussed in the next section. In that case higher order expectations are equal
to the average expectation and there is no inﬁnite regress problem. This can
be understood as follows. When T = 1, investors do not use information from
previous periods to update their expectations since the new information at time t
is the fundamental ft (which is obviously superior to any previous private signals
about ft). Thus, at time t an investor should not expect his own expectation at
t +1t ob ed i ﬀerent from that of others. Therefore the second order expectation
is equal to the average expectation. The same is the case for even higher order
expectations.
In the more general setup where T>1, investors do use information from
previous periods to update their expectations. For example, private information
at time t aﬀects time t + 1 expectations of future fundamentals. In that case
investors at time t expect their own expectation at t +1t obed i ﬀerent from that
of other investors, since they expect others to have received a diﬀerent signal at
time t. The expectation of signals by other investors is the expectation of ut,
which is generally diﬀerent from the investor’s own signal. When investors expect
their own expectation next period to diﬀer from that of others, the second order
expectation is not equal to the average expectation. The same is the case for even
higher order expectations.
Townsend [1983] points out that the state space becomes inﬁnite when there are
inﬁnitely many higher order expectations. He proposes an exact solution method
when the number of unknown shocks is ﬁnite. Here we provide a brief description
of the application to our model, leaving details to Appendix D. One can write
down a Wold representation of the equilibrium exchange rate as
st = A(L)ε
u
t + B(L)ε
b
t (12)
where A(L)a n dB(L)a r ei n ﬁnite order polynomials in the lag operator L.T h e
9errors εiv
t do not enter the exchange rate equation as they average to zero across
investors. Since at time t investors observe the fundamental ft, only the new
innovations εu between time t − T +1a n dt i m et are unknown. The same is
true for innovations to non-fundamentals trade. Exchange rates at time t−T and
earlier, together with knowledge of εu at time t − T and earlier, reveal the shocks
εb at time t − T and earlier.
Investors can then solve a signal extraction problem for the ﬁnite number of
unknown innovations. Both private signals and exchange rates from time t−T +1
to t provide information about the innovations. The solution to the signal ex-
traction problem leads to expectations at time t of the unknowns as a function of
observables, which in turn can be written as a function of the innovations them-
selves. One can then compute the average expectation of st+1. Substituting the
result into the interest parity condition (6) leads to a new exchange rate equation.
The coeﬃcients of the polynomials A(L)a n dB(L) can then be derived by solving
a ﬁxed point problem, equating the coeﬃcients of the conjectured exchange rate
equation when solving the signal extraction problem to those in the equilibrium
exchange rate equation. Although the lag polynomials are of inﬁnite order, for lags
longer than T periods the information dispersion plays no role and an analytical
solution to the coeﬃcients is feasible.
The Townsend method cannot be applied when investors have inﬁnite horizons.
In that case investors maximize
−Et
Ã ∞ X
s=0
β
se
−γci
t+s
!
(13)
subject to
w
i
t+1 =( 1+it)w
i
t +( st+1 − st + i
∗
t − it)b
i
t − it ˜ m
i
t + f(f m
i
t) − c
i
t (14)
Appendix E provides a detailed solution method for this problem. The portfolio
maximization problem is now substantially more complicated and the interest rate
parity condition needs to be modiﬁed. Investors now need to take into account
uncertainty about future expected returns, and therefore future investment oppor-
tunities. They hedge against this risk when choosing their portfolio, but this hedge
term depends on the inﬁnite state space, which complicates matters. We obtain a
close approximate solution by truncating the state space for suﬃciently long lags.
10To be precise, let the state space of observables for an investor i be st−1, ft
and vi
t,w h e r ext={xt,x t−1,...}0. The aggregate of the private signals is u,s ot h a t
R 1
0 vi
t = ut. We then conjecture the following equilibrium exchange rate equation
as a function of the aggregate state space and the supply shock bt:
st = λsst−1 + λfft + λuut + λbbt (15)
We truncate the state space for lags more than T (>T ). Coeﬃcients in the ex-
change rate equation for longer lags are set equal to zero. In our benchmark case
where T = 8, setting T =2 5t u r n so u tt ob es u ﬃcient. A larger T leaves results vir-
tually unchanged. We solve the portfolio maximization problem by maximizing a
Bellman equation, using both the conjectured exchange rate equation and a conjec-
tured value function. The latter depends on the investor’s wealth and a quadratic
function of the investor’s truncated state space. In solving the portfolio maximiza-
tion problem we need to know the expectations of the unknowns ut,..,ut−T+1,b t as
a function of the investor’s state space, which we compute through a Kalman ﬁlter
technique. The conjectured exchange rate equation is again equated to the equilib-
rium exchange rate equation that follows f r o mt h ea s s e tm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u m .W e
also have to solve a ﬁxed point problem for the parameters of the conjectured value
function. All details can be found in the Appendix. We show in the Appendix that
results based on this approximate solution technique for inﬁnite horizon investors
are almost identical to those based on applying the Townsend technique to the
model with overlapping generations of investors. The results reported in section
IV are based on the latter.
I I I T h eI m p a c to fI n f o r m a t i o nD i s p e r s i o n
In this section we examine the channels through which lack of common knowledge
disconnects the exchange rate from its fundamental determinants. We will show
that information heterogeneity leads to both magniﬁcation and endogenous per-
sistence of the impact of non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate. We ﬁrst
illustrate the magniﬁcation eﬀect for the case T = 1, where there is no inﬁnite
regress and the model has an analytical solution. We then show that higher order
expectations further raise the magniﬁcation eﬀect when they diﬀer from simple
average expectations. This is the case for T>1. Finally, we show that for T>1
11there is endogenous persistence of the impact of non-fundamentals shocks on the
exchange rate.
III.A Magniﬁcation
In addition to assuming T = 1, so that there is no inﬁnite regress problem, we
further simplify by setting ρ1 = ρ2 =0a n dρb = 0. In this case, equation (7)
becomes:
st =
1
1+α
·
ft +
α
1+α
Etut
¸
−
α
1+α
γσ
2
tbt (16)
Only the average expectation of ut appears, which is next period’s fundamental.
All higher order expectations are zero in this case.21
III.A.1 Common knowledge
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the case where all investors receive the same
information. They have two pieces of information about ut: the signal vt = ut+εv
t
and the fact that ut = εu
t.D e ﬁning the precision of these signals as βv,c ≡ 1/σ2
v,c
and βu ≡ 1/σ2
u, the conditional expectation of ut is
E
i
tut = Etut =
βv,cvt
d
(17)
where d ≡ 1/vart(ut)=βv,c + βu. Substitution into (16) yields the equilibrium
exchange rate:
st =
1
1+α
ft + λvvt + λ
c
b,tbt (18)
where
λv =
α
(1 + α)
2
βv,c
d
(19)
λ
c
b,t = −
α
1+α
γσ
2
t (20)
In addition to the observable fundamental, ft, both the signal, vt,a n dt h e
non-fundamental factor, bt,a ﬀect the exchange rate. Notice that in this case the
exchange rate is fully revealing, since by observing st investors can perfectly deduce
bt.
21If we allow for some persistence in the fundamental, higher order expectations are not zero,
but still equal to average expectations of future fundamentals.
12The weight of the signal naturally depends on its precision βv,c.T h ew e i g h to f
the bt shock depends on σ2
t = vart(st+1), the conditional variance of next period’s
exchange rate. We show in Appendix B that there are two steady-states values
for σ2
t, but only one (the low value) is well deﬁned. Hence, we focus on the low σ2
steady state. This implies that the coeﬃcient λc
b,t is constant, λc
b,t = λc
b.
III.A.2 Heterogeneous Information
We now assume that investors get private signals vi
t about ut as given in (10).
Due to the law of large numbers the aggregation of private signals is ut,w h i c h
implies that the exchange rate will be aﬀected directly by ut. Therefore, individual
investors get information about ut by observing the exchange rate st. However, the
exchange rate is not fully revealing, as it gives information about a combination
of ut and bt. To determine the information given by st,w en e e dt ok n o wt h e
equilibrium exchange rate equation. By analogy to (18), the investor conjectures
that:
st =
1
1+α
ft + λuut + λbbt (21)
Since an investor observes ft, the signal he gets from the exchange rate can be
written Ã
st −
ft
1+α
!
/λu = ut +
λb
λu
bt (22)
T h ev a r i a n c eo ft h i ss i g n a li s( λb/λu)2σ2
b. Consequently, investor i infers Ei
tut from
three sources of information: i) the distribution of ut; ii) the signal vi
t; iii) the
exchange rate (i.e., (22)). As usual, Ei
tut is given by a weighted average of the
three signals, with the weights determined by the precision of each signal. We
have:
E
i
tut =
βvvi
t + βs(st −
ft
1+α)/λu
D
(23)
where βv =1 /σ2
v, βs =1 /(λb/λu)2σ2
b and D =1 /var(ut)=βv + βu + βs.F o rt h e
exchange rate signal, the precision is complex and depends both on σ2
b and λb/λu,
the latter being endogenous. By substituti n g( 2 3 )i n t o( 1 6 )a n du s i n gt h ef a c tt h a t
R 1
0 vi
tdi = ut in computing Etut, it can be easily seen that (21) indeed holds.
13III.A.3 The Magniﬁcation Factor
Since investors do not know whether a change in the exchange rate is driven by
non-fundamentals shocks or fundamentals information of other investors, they al-
ways revise their expectations of fundamentals when the exchange rate changes
(equation (23)). This magniﬁes the impact of non-fundamental shocks on the ex-
change rate. More speciﬁcally, from (16) and (23), we can see that a change in bt
has two eﬀects on st.F i r s t ,i ta ﬀects st directly in (16) through the risk-premium
channel. Second, this direct eﬀect is magniﬁed by an increase in Etut from (23).
T h ed e g r e eo fm a g n i ﬁcation is given by z>1:
λb = zλ
c
b (24)
where λc
b is deﬁned in (20).22 The magniﬁcation factor can be written as
z =1+x
2σ2
v
σ2
b
(25)
where x = λu/λb is the relative weight of ut and bt i nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ee q u a t i o n .
Figure 1 shows the impact of some key parameters on magniﬁcation. A rise
in the private signal variance σ2
v at ﬁrst raises magniﬁc a t i o na n dt h e nl o w e r si t
(Panel A). Two opposite forces are at work. First, as shown in (25), for a given
x an increase in σ2
v raises magniﬁcation. This is because more weight is given
to the exchange rate as a source of information. Second, a rise in σ2
v implies
less information and therefore a lower relative weight x of fundamentals in the
exchange rate equation (Panel B). This makes the exchange rate less informative
about fundamentals and reduces the magniﬁcation factor. On the other hand, a
rise in the variance σ2
b of non-fundamentals shocks always reduces magniﬁcation
since it makes it more diﬃcult to extract information about fundamentals from
22We implicitly assume that the conditional variance of the exchange rate is the same in the
two models. Holding constant the precision of the private signal, one can always change the
precision of the signal with common knowledge to make sure that this is the case. In section IV
we show that at the quantitative level the main results are not much diﬀerent when we instead
hold the precision of the signals the same in the two models. In that case the conditional variance
can be higher in either model. On the one hand, the exchange rate provides an additional piece
of information in the heterogeneous information model, which lowers the conditional variance.
On the other hand, the magniﬁcation factor z raises the conditional variance.
14the exchange rate.23 Numerical simulations also show that a rise in the variance
σ2
u reduces the magniﬁcation factor. Intuitively, a higher variance of fundamentals
shocks raises the risk-premium and therefore increases the relative weight of non-
fundamentals shocks. This reduces the information content of the exchange rate.
III.B Higher Order Expectations: Further Magniﬁcation
As discussed in section II, higher order expectations diﬀer from simple average
expectations when expectations of future fundamentals at time t are aﬀected by
private signals from previous periods. In the context of a model that satisﬁes this
property, Allen, Morris and Shin [2002] show that higher order expectations of
a future fundamental are more sensitive to public information than the average
expectation: in forming expectations of other investors’ expectations more weight
is given to public information that is available to all investors. Since in our setup
the exchange rate is an important public signal, it has a larger impact on higher
order expectations, leading to additional magniﬁcation.24
In our model, expectations of future fundamentals are aﬀected by private sig-
nals from previous periods as long as T>1. Consider the case where T =2 ,w h i l e
we still keep ρ1 = ρ2 = ρb = 0. The exchange rate equation (7) becomes:
st =
1
1+α
"
ft +
α
1+α
Etut−1 +
µ α
1+α
¶2
E
2
tut + ...
#
−
α
1+α
γσ
2
tbt (26)
where the number of terms in square brackets goes to inﬁnity. Thus, we have
inﬁnite regress. In order to see the role of higher order expectations, consider
E
2
tut = Et(Et+1ut). Appendix C shows that:
E
2
tut = Etut + ku(Etut − ut)( 2 7 )
where ku = ∂Ei
t+1ut/∂vi
t > 0 is the impact of the private signal at time t on an
investor’s expectation at time t +1 . S i n c eEtut depends positively on st in a way
analogous to (23), higher order expectations give more weight to the exchange
rate than simple average expectations, contributing to the magniﬁcation eﬀect.
Appendix C shows that as the order of expectation increases further, even more
weight is given to the exchange rate.
23This can be seen directly from (25). It is only partially oﬀset by the resulting rise in x.
24Allen, Morris and Shin [2002] focus on the case of inﬁnite noise, so that the asset price itself
is not a signal.
15III.C Persistence
An additional feature of the model is the endogenous persistence of the impact of
non-fundamental shocks on the exchange rate. This is caused by the combination of
heterogeneous information and giving positive weight to information from previous
periods in forming expectations (for T>1). To illustrate persistence, consider the
case presented above where T = 2. Persistence comes from the fact that Ei
tut−1
depends on prior information about ut−1 at t−1 .O n es o u r c eo fp r i o ri n f o r m a t i o n
i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt − 1. Since the exchange rate at t − 1i sa ﬀected by bt−1
a non-fundamental shock at t − 1 continues to aﬀect the exchange rate at time t
by aﬀecting the expectation at time t of the future fundamental ut−1 = ft+1.T h i s
is the case even if the non-fundamental shock itself has no persistence (ρb =0 ) ,
as we have assumed so far.25 In the common knowledge model, a b-shock has no
persistent impact on the exchange rate if the shock itself has no persistence.
From (15) it is immediately clear that an entirely transitory b-shock continues
t oi m p a c tt h ee x c h a n g er a t ef o rT periods. After T periods there is no longer any
uncertainty about whether a change in the exchange rate T periods earlier was
caused by non-fundamentals or fundamentals. The reason is that the vector ut
is known at t + T. From (15) investors then also know bt at time t + T.T h e
impact of a b-shock dies down over time as investors gradually learn more about
the fundamentals.
The persistence of the b-shock on the exchange rate is also aﬀected by the
persistence of the shock itself. In the common knowledge model, the persistence
of the impact of a b- s h o c ko nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ei st h es a m ea st h ep e r s i s t e n c eo f
the shock itself. In the heterogeneous information model, persistence is largely
driven by the persistence of the magniﬁcation factor. More precisely, it is driven
by the persistence of the impact of the b-shock on expected future fundamentals
and therefore the persistence of the rational confusion. When the b-shock itself
becomes more persistent, it becomes more diﬃcult for investors to learn from
exchange rates subsequent to time t whether a change in the exchange rate at time
t was a result of fundamentals or non-fundamentals (bt). The rational confusion is
25This result is related to ﬁndings by Brown and Jennings [1989] and Grundy and McNichols
[1989], who show in the context of two-period noisy rational expectations models that the asset
price in the second period is aﬀected by the asset price in the ﬁrst period.
16therefore more persistent and so is the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate.26
IV The General Dynamic Model
In this section we fully solve the general dynamic structure of the model where
T>1 and both fundamentals and non-fundamentals follow an autoregressive pro-
cess. We ﬁrst illustrate the key implications of the model with a benchmark param-
eterization. Then we consider how the main features are aﬀected by the model’s
parameters, which provides further insight into the operation of the model. Finally,
in the last subsection we discuss the ‘excess volatility’ puzzle and solve a sticky-
price version of the model. We illustrate how information dispersion contributes
to excess volatility.
IV.A A Benchmark Case
The parameters of the benchmark case are reported in Table 1. They are chosen
mainly to illustrate the potential impact of information dispersion; they are not
calibrated or chosen to match any data moments. We assume that u,a n dt h e r e f o r e
the fundamental, follows a random walk (ρ = 0). We assume that the extent of
private information is small by setting a high standard deviation of the private
signal error of 0.08, versus a 0.01 standard deviation of u. Although we have made
assumptions about both σb and risk-aversion γ, they enter multiplicatively in the
model, so only their product matters. We allow for an AR coeﬃcient of 0.8 of the
non-fundamentals b-shock. Finally, we assume that T = 8, so that agents obtain
private signals about fundamentals eight periods later.
Figure 2 shows some of the key results from the benchmark parameterization.
Panels A and B show the dynamic impact on the exchange rate in response to
one-standard deviation shocks in the private and common knowledge models. In
both models the non-fundamentals shocks are the b-shocks. In the heterogeneous
26When bt follows a random walk, the persistence of its impact on the exchange rate is smaller in
the heterogeneous information model than in the common knowledge model because the rational
confusion in the heterogeneous information model is temporary (lasts T periods). However,
persistence in the common knowledge model has little meaning when the impact of b-shocks on
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sv e r ys m a l l .
17information model the fundamentals shocks are the u-shocks. In the common
knowledge model the fundamentals shocks are both u-shocks and εv shocks, which
aﬀect the exchange rate through the publicly observable fundamentals f and v.I n
order to facilitate comparison, we again set the precision of the public signal such
that the conditional variance of next period’s exchange rate is the same as in the
heterogeneous information model. This implies that the b-shocks have the same
risk-premium eﬀect in the two models. We will show below that our key results
do not depend on the assumed precision of the public signal.
Magniﬁcation
The magniﬁcation factor in the benchmark parameterization turns out to be
substantial: 7.2. This is visualized in Figure 2 by comparing the instantaneous
response of the exchange rate to the b-shocks in the two models in panels A and
B. The only reason the impact of a b-shock is so much bigger in the heteroge-
neous information model is the magniﬁcation factor associated with information
dispersion.
We saw in section III that higher order expectations contribute to the magniﬁ-
cation factor. It is hard to quantify the role of higher order expectations since one
cannot remove them. Nonetheless we can get a sense of the importance of higher
order expectations by doing an artiﬁcial experiment: we replace the higher order
expectations of future f’s and b’s in the exchange rate equation (7) with simple
average expectations. Both with and witho u th i g h e ro r d e re x p e c t a t i o n st h ec o e f -
ﬁcient on bt on the right hand side of (7) is ¯ λb = −αγσ2/(1 + α). The question is
how the right-hand side of (7), i.e., the expected present discounted value of future
fundamentals and b’s, depends on st. Let this impact be ν.T h e n ,t h ec o e ﬃcient
on bt in the equilibrium exchange rate equation (15) is λb = ¯ λb/(1−ν). For higher
order expectations ν =0 .962, while for average expectations ν =0 .907.27 This
implies that 1/(1−ν) is 2.4 larger under higher order expectations, implying also
am a g n i ﬁcation factor that is 2.4 larger. This suggests a substantial role for higher
27F o rh i g h e ro r d e re x p e c t a t i o n sν follows immediately since we know λb from the solution
method.
18order expectations in contributing to the magniﬁcation factor.
Persistence
We can see from panel A that after the initial shock the impact of the b-shocks
dies down almost as a linear function of time. The half-life of the impact of the
shock is 3 periods. After 8 periods the rational confusion is resolved and the
impact is the same as in the public information model, which is close to zero. The
meaning of a 3-period half-life depends of course on what we mean by a period in
the model. As we will discuss below, what matters in the model is not so much
the length of a period, but the length of time it takes for uncertainty about future
fundamentals to be resolved.
Exchange rate disconnect in the short and the long run
Panel C reports the contribution of non-fundamentals trade to the variance of
st+k−st at diﬀerent horizons. In the heterogeneous information model, 70% of the
variance of a 1-period change in the exchange rate is driven by non-fundamentals
shocks, while in the common knowledge model it is a negligible 1.3%. This is
almost entirely due to the much larger impact of non-fundamentals shocks in the
heterogeneous information model.
The low contribution of non-fundamentals trade to exchange rate volatility
in the common knowledge model does not depend on the extent of noise in the
public signal. In our simulations, we set the standard deviation of the public signal
noise at 0.033, so that the unconditional variance of the 1-period change in the
exchange rate is the same as in the heterogeneous information model. When we set
the standard deviation of the public noise at 0 and 0.08 (same as private signal),
the contribution of non-fundamentals shocks to the variance of the 1-period change
in the exchange rate is respectively 0.6% and 2.4%.
While in the short-run non-fundamentals shocks dominate in the heterogeneous
information model, in the long-run fundamentals shocks dominate. The impact of
a change in non-fundamentals trade on the exchange rate gradually dies down as
investors learn more about the fundamentals and rational confusion dissipates. On
the other hand, the impact of u-shocks on the exchange rate rises over time as we
get closer to the time of the rise in the fundamental f and as agents gradually
learn that the shock took place. In panel C we see that the contribution of non-
19fundamentals shocks to the variance of st+k−st declines as the horizons k increases.
For a three-period horizon the contribution of the two shocks to exchange rate
volatility is about the same, while the contribution of b-shocks declines to less
than 20% after ten periods.
In order to determine the relationship between exchange rates and fundamen-
tals, panel D reports the R2 of a regression of st+k − st on all current and lagged
observable fundamentals. In the heterogeneous information model this includes all
one period changes in the fundamental ft,f r o mt+k−1t ot+k and back. In the
common knowledge model it also includes the corresponding one-period changes in
the public signal v.T h eR2 is close to 1 for all horizons in the common knowledge
model, while it is much lower in the heterogeneous information model.28 At the
one-period horizon it is only 0.14, and then rises as the horizon increases, to 0.8
for a 20-period horizon. This is consistent with extensive ﬁndings that macroeco-
nomic fundamentals have weak explanatory power for exchange rates in the short
to medium run, starting with Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983], and ﬁndings of a much
closer relationship over longer horizons.29 Two factors account for the results in
panel D. The ﬁrst is that the relative contribution of non-fundamentals shocks
to exchange rate volatility is large in the short-run and small in the long-run, as
illustrated in panel C. The second factor is that through private signals the ex-
change rate is also aﬀected by future fundamentals that are not yet observable
today. This second factor again aﬀects the exchange rate more in the short-run
than the long-run.
Exchange rate and future fundamentals
Recently Engel and West [2002] and Froot and Ramadorai [2002] have reported
evidence that exchange rate changes predict future fundamentals, but only weakly
so. Our model is consistent with these ﬁndings. Panel E of Figure 2 reports the
R2 of a regression ft+k − ft+1 on st+1 − st for k ≥ 2. The R2 is positive, but is
never above 0.14. The exchange rate is aﬀected by the private signals of future
fundamentals, which aggregate to u. However, most of the short-run volatility of
28The high R2 in the common knowledge model is again independent of the extent of noise in
the public signal.
29See MacDonald and Taylor [1993], Mark [1995], Chinn and Meese [1995], Mark and Sul [2001]
and Froot and Ramadorai [2002].
20exchange rates is associated with non-fundamentals shocks, which do not predict
future fundamentals. Even though exchange rates have only weak explanatory
power for future fundamentals, investors in the model still give a lot of weight to
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ea sas o u r c eo fi n f o r m a t ion because the private signals are even
weaker.
IV.B Sensitivity to Model Parameters
In order to gain further insight, we now examine how the main results are aﬀected
by parameter values. Figure 3 contains seven panels showing (i) the magniﬁcation
factor, (ii) the contribution of b-shocks to var(st+1 − st), and (iii) persistence,
measured by the half-life of the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate. They are
each plotted as a function of a speciﬁc parameter.
Private information
Perhaps the most important parameter of the model is the precision of the
private signal. Panel A shows the sensitivity to σv, the standard deviation of the
error in the private signal. In section III we already discussed the impact of σv
on magniﬁcation, zt. Even though the current model is much richer, the results
in this respect are qualitatively the same as before. In particular, magniﬁcation
rises up to σv =0 .06, and then drops. Consistent with that we also ﬁnd that the
contribution of non-fundamentals shocks to exchange rate volatility ﬁrst rises, up
to σv =0 .08, and then drops.
The overall implication from these results is that the impact of information dis-
persion on exchange rate dynamics is most powerful for some intermediate range.
When σ2
v is low it is possible to raise the magniﬁcation factor, increase the contri-
bution of non-fundamentals shocks to exchange rate volatility, while at the same
time making the impact of non-fundamentals shocks more persistent. When infor-
mation becomes too disperse, however, the magniﬁcation factor decreases and the
contribution of non-fundamentals shocks to exchange rate volatility is lower.
Non-fundamental shocks
Panel B illustrates the role of the standard deviation σb of non-fundamentals
trade, and panel C the role of persistence ρb of the non-fundamentals shocks. Both
21a higher standard deviation and more persistence of the non-fundamentals shocks
reduce magniﬁcation as the exchange rate becomes less informative about funda-
mentals. In both cases the contribution of non-fundamentals shocks to exchange
rate volatility is almost constant over a wide range of parameters. One can for
example signiﬁcantly reduce the standard deviation of non-fundamentals shocks,
while the contribution of these shocks to exchange rate volatility remains almost
the same. This is a result of two factors. First, the magniﬁcation factor rises. Sec-
ond, less weight is given to private signals when the exchange rate signal becomes
stronger, weakening the contribution of u-shocks to exchange rate volatility. When
σb → 0 the magniﬁcation factor converges to inﬁnity, but the contribution of non-
fundamentals shocks to exchange rate volatility nonetheless goes to zero. That is
a desirable property since it would be peculiar if inﬁnitesimally small idiosyncratic
trades become the dominant source of exchange rate volatility.
As anticipated in the previous section, we also see from panel C that a rise
in persistence of b-shocks leads to more persistence of its impact on the exchange
rate. It takes more time for investors to distinguish between fundamentals and
non-fundamentals shocks, so that the rational confusion persists longer.
It is important to stress that the closer relationship between exchange rates and
fundamentals in the long-run than the short run is entirely the result of the fact that
the rational confusion dissipates in the long run; it is not due to our assumption
that non-fundamentals trade is stationary, while the fundamental is non-stationary.
Consider for example the case where ρb =1a n dσb =0 .006 and other parameters
remain unchanged. Both fundamentals and non-fundamentals trade are then non-
stationary. In this case, the long-run impact of non-fundamentals trade is the same
in the public and heterogeneous information models and is only associated with
the risk-premium channel. However, the short-run impact is much larger in the
heterogeneous information model due to the magniﬁcation factor (which is 4.1 in
this case), while in the common knowledge model the short and long-run impact
22are the same.30
Fundamental shocks
Panels D and E of Figure 3 show the impact of respectively the standard devia-
tion and persistence of fundamentals shocks. An increase in either σu or ρ reduces
the magniﬁcation factor. The increased risk raises the risk-premium and therefore
the coeﬃcient of bt i nt h ee x c h a n g er a t e .T h i sm a k e si tm o r ed i ﬃcult to extract
information about fundamentals from the exchange rate. The contribution of non-
fundamentals shocks to exchange rate volatility is again remarkably insensitive to
parameters. Even though more volatile fundamentals now generate more exchange
rate volatility, the same is the case for non-fundamentals shocks as a result of the
rise in the risk-premium.
The parameter T
Panel F shows the impact of T.M a g n i ﬁcation rises as agents have private
information about fundamentals further into the future (T bigger). The higher T,
the more information agents have at any point in time, and therefore the lower
the uncertainty about next period’s exchange rate. This reduces the risk-premium
and therefore the coeﬃcient of bt in the exchange rate, so t h a tt h ee x c h a n g er a t e
becomes more informative about fundamentals and the magniﬁcation factor rises.
Persistence also increases as T goes up as it takes T periods for investors to learn
t h ea c t u a ls i z eo ft h eb-shock and for rational confusion to dissipate.
The size of the parameter T also brings up the question of what we mean by a
“period” in the model. This is particularly relevant in the context of persistence.
It turns out that what is critical in the model is not the length of a period, but
the length of time it takes for uncertainty about future macro variables to be
resolved. For example, assume that T is eight months. If a period in our model
is a month, then T = 8. If a period is three days, then T = 80. When we change
the length of a period we also need to change other model parameters, such as
the standard deviations of the shocks. We ﬁnd that the half-life of the impact of
30In this case, the relative contribution of non-fundamentals trade to exchange rate volatility
is 76% for a 1-period horizon and 19% for a 20-period horizon. Similarly, the R2 of a regression
of the change in the exchange rate on current and lagged observable fundamentals rises from 0.2
for a 1-period horizon to 0.75 for a 20-period horizon.
23non-fundamentals shocks on the exchange rate that can be generated by the model
remains virtually unchanged as we change the length of a period.31 For T =8t h e
model can generate a half-life of about 3, as in the benchmark parameterization.
When T = 80, we can obtain a half-life of about 30 when we change other model
parameters.32 In both cases the half-life is 3 months. Persistence is therefore
driven critically by the length of time it takes for uncertainty to resolve itself.
Deviations from fundamentals can be very long lasting when expectations about
future fundamentals take a long time to verify, such as expectations about the
long-term technology growth rate of the economy.
IV.C ’Excess’ Volatility
Although our focus has been on the exchange rate determination puzzle, we brieﬂy
discuss the puzzle of excess volatility of exchange rates relative to fundamen-
tals. The exchange rate determination puzzle and the excess volatility puzzle
are two distinct puzzles that may not have the same explanation. For example,
the Dornbusch-overshooting model can easily generate excess volatility, but ex-
change rates are driven entirely by fundamentals. In our model the opposite is
true under the benchmark parameterization. The model generates a weak rela-
tionship between exchange rates and fundamentals, but the standard deviation of
a one-period change in the exchange rate is only 0.7 times the standard deviation
of a one-period change in the fundamentals. This does not mean that information
dispersion plays no role in understanding the excess volatility puzzle. We will show
that information dispersion signiﬁcantly contributes to excess volatility, but other
factors play a role as well. In particular, we will introduce nominal rigidities and
increase the persistence of the fundamental.
In order to shed light on the excess volatility puzzle, consider one-period excess
volatility measured by the ratio of the variances of exchange rate and fundamentals
31In doing so we restrict parameters such that (i) the contribution of b-shocks to var(st+1−st)
is held at around 70% and (ii) the impact of b-shocks on exchange rate volatility remains largely
driven by information dispersion (large magniﬁcation factor).
32For example, when we change the benchmark parameterization such that T = 80, σv =0 .26,
σu =0 .0016 and α = 44, the half-life is 28 periods. The magniﬁcation factor is 48 and the
contribution of non-fundamentals trade to 1-period changes in the exchange rate is 69%.
24changes. It is useful to write this ratio as follows:
var(st+1 − st)
var(ft+1 − ft)
=
1
1 − contr
varu(st+1 − st)
var(ft+1 − ft)
(28)
where contr is the fraction of the unconditional variance of one-period exchange
rate changes contributed by non-fundamentals trade and varu(st+1−st)i st h ev a r i -
ance of one-period exchange rate changes resulting from fundamentals shocks. The
excess volatility ratio is made of two elements. The ﬁrst element depends on the
contribution of non-fundamentals trade toe x c h a n g er a t ev o l a t i l i t y .W eh a v es e e n
that information dispersion signiﬁcantly raises contr, for example to 0.7 under the
benchmark parameterization. This raises excess volatility ratio by a factor larger
than 3. So information dispersion raises the ﬁrst element. The second element de-
pends on how much shocks to fundamentals themselves contribute to the ratio of
exchange rate to fundamentals variance. In the benchmark parameterization this
second element is very low: 0.15. Even though the fundamental follows a random
walk, this ratio is less than 1 in the benchmark parameterization both because a
change in ut aﬀects the fundamental in the future and because investors only have
incomplete information about the change in ut.
In order to obtain substantial excess volatility, we need to raise the second term
on the right hand side of (28). For this purpose, we introduce two changes in the
benchmark model. First, we raise ρ. This implies that a rise in the fundamental
today is expected to lead to a much larger long-run increase in the fundamen-
tal, so that the exchange rate changes much more than an unexpected increase in
the fundamental. Second, we introduce nominal rigidities, as in the Dornbusch-
overshooting model. We illustrate the impact of nominal rigidities by assuming
that prices gradually adjust with delay to restore purchasing power parity accord-
ing to:
p
∗
t+1 − p
∗
t = φ(pt − st − p
∗
t)( 2 9 )
where φ is a parameter between 0 and 1, with a lower number implying more rigid
prices.33
Consider the impact of raising ρ from 0 to 0.8 and introducing nominal rigidi-
ties with φ =0 .1. We also reduce the standard deviation of non-fundamentals
33When φ = 1, prices adjust with only one period delay to restore purchasing power parity.
This is still slower than in the baseline model, where prices adjust instantaneously.
25trade from 0.01 to 0.003.34 Under this parameterization the contribution of non-
fundamentals trade to exchange rate volatility is 82% (contr=0.82) and it is still
mostly the result of information dispersion as the magniﬁcation factor remains
high at 3.4. Fundamentals shocks alone lead to a variance of the exchange rate
that is 1.7 times the variance of fundamentals (the second element in (28)). The
large contribution of non-fundamentals shocks makes the overall variance of the
1-period change in the exchange rate 9.4 times the variance of 1-period changes in
fundamentals. This example shows that information dispersion exacerbates excess
volatility.
VC o n c l u s i o n
The large volume of trade in the foreign exchange market and the close relation-
ship between order ﬂow and exchange rates suggests that investor heterogeneity
may be a key element in understanding exchange rate behavior. In this paper,
we have explored the implications of information dispersion in a simple model of
exchange rate determination. We have shown that these implications are rich and
that investors’ heterogeneity could be an important element in explaining the be-
havior of exchange rates. In particular, the model can account for some important
stylized facts on the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals: (i)
fundamentals have little explanatory power for short to medium run exchange rate
movements, (ii) over longer horizons the exchange rate is primarily driven by fun-
damentals, (iii) exchange rate changes are a weak predictor of future fundamentals.
We have also shown that information dispersion contributes to excess volatility of
the exchange rate relative to fundamentals, although other factors play a role as
well.
The paper should be considered only as a ﬁrst step in a promising line of
research. A natural next step is to introduce microstructure institutions such as
foreign exchange dealers to the model. This will help to better integrate microstruc-
34The increased exchange rate volatility that results from nominal rigidities and raising ρ re-
duces the magniﬁcation factor. We therefore reduce the standard deviation of non-fundamentals
shocks in order to keep the magniﬁcation factor high. The contribution of non-fundamentals
shocks then remains primarily driven by the rational confusion resulting from information
dispersion.
26ture and macro models of exchange rate determination. Moreover, it should enable
us to bring the model to the data. Modeling microstructure institutions allows us
to compute order ﬂow in the model, which is closely related to non-fundamentals
shocks. This may give us an estimate on the size of these shocks and determine
the extent of magniﬁcation that is necessary to understand observed exchange rate
volatility. The magniﬁcation factor may be large. Back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions by Gennotte and Leland [1990] in the context of a static model for the U.S.
stock market crash of October 1987 suggest that the impact of a $6 bln. non-
fundamental shock was magniﬁed by a factor 250 due to rational confusion about
the source of the stock price decline.
There are two other natural directions in which the model can be extended.
The ﬁrst is to explicitly model nominal rigidities as in the “new open economy
macro” literature. In that literature exchange rates are entirely driven by funda-
mentals. Conclusions that have been drawn about optimal monetary and exchange
rate policies are likely to be substantially revised when introducing investor het-
erogeneity. Another direction is to consider alternative information structures.
For example, the information received by agents may diﬀer in its quality or in its
timing. There can also be heterogeneity about the knowledge of the underlying
model.35 The rapidly growing body of empirical work on order ﬂows in the mi-
crostructure literature is likely to increase our understanding of the nature of the
information structure, providing guidance to future modeling.
35See Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) for a recent analysis in diﬀerent contexts.
27Appendix
A Derivation of equation (7)
I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 1 ) ,( 2 ) ,( 3 ) ,a n d( 6 )t h a t
st =
α
1+α
¯ E
1
t(st+1)+
1
1+α
ft −
α
1+α
γσtbt (30)
Therefore
¯ E
1
t(st+1)=
α
1+α
¯ E
2
t(st+2)+
1
1+α
¯ E
1
t(ft+1) −
α
1+α
γσt+1 ¯ E
1
t(bt+1)( 3 1 )
Substitution into (30) yields
st =
µ α
1+α
¶2
¯ E
2
t(st+2)+
1
1+α
1 X
k=0
µ α
1+α
¶k
E
k
t (ft+k − αγσt+kbt+k)( 3 2 )
Continuing to solve for st this way by forward induction yields (7).
B Conditional variance of next period’s exchange
rate
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e .F r o m( 1 8 )a tt +1 :
σ
2
t = a + bσ
4
t+1 (33)
where a =( 1+d˜ αβv,c/βu)/d(1 + α)2, b = γ2σ2
b e α and e α =( α/(1 + α))2.I n t h e
steady state, σ2 = σ2
t = σ2
t+1.I ti se a s yt os e et h a t :
σ
2 =
1 ±
√
1 − 4ab
2b
(34)
T h u s ,a sl o n ga s4 ab < 1, there are two steady states with low and high σ2.F r o m
(33), dσ2
t/dσ2
t+1 =2 bσ2 =1±
√
1 − 4ab. Thus, dσ2
t/dσ2
t+1 < 1 around the low σ2
steady state and dσ2
t/dσ2
t+1 > 1f o rt h eh i g hσ2 steady state. Since σ2
t is a forward-
looking variable, only the low σ2 steady state gives a stable equilibrium.36 The
36See, for example, Blanchard and Fischer [1989], ch. 5 for a discussion of these issues.
28high steady state equilibrium is knife-edge, in that it can only be an equilibrium
today if one believes that σt is exactly the high steady state equilibrium at all
future dates. In the model with heterogeneous information, the results are similar,
even though σ2 has to be evaluated numerically.
C Higher order expectations
In this Appendix we derive a lemma determining the bias of higher order expecta-
t i o n st h a ti su s e dt od e r i v eE q u a t i o n( 27). Consider a stochastic variable xt+1 in
the model with T>1. To estimate its value at time t+1, assume that an investor
uses a linear rule based on all relevant available information:
E
i
t+1xt+1 = ksst + k
1
sst+1 + kfft + k
1
fft+1 + kuv
i
t + k
1
uv
i
t+1 (35)
Only private signals in the last T periods matter, such that vi0
t =( vi
t,vi
t−1,...,vi
t−T+2).
Lemma 1: When investors use the rule (35) we have:
Et(Et+1xt+1) − Etxt+1 = ku(Etut − ut)( 3 6 )
Proof: First compute Etxt+1. From (35) we ﬁnd:
E
i
txt+1 = E
i
t(E
i
t+1xt+1)=ksst+kfft+kuv
i
t+k
1
sE
i
tst+1+k
1
fE
i
tft+1+k
1
uE
i
tv
i
t+1 (37)
Aggregating:
Etxt+1 = ksst + kfft + kuut + k
1
sEtst+1 + k
1
fEtut+1−T + k
1
uEtut+1 (38)
Now compute Et(Et+1xt+1). Aggregating (35) we have:
Et+1xt+1 = ksst + kfft + kuut + k
1
sst+1 + k
1
fft+1 + k
1
uut+1 (39)
Then:
Et(Et+1xt+1)=ksst + kfft + kuEtut + k
1
sEtst+1 + k
1
fEtut+1−T + k
1
uEtut+1 (40)
Subtracting (38) from (40) gives (36). Q.E.D.
29Since Etut depends positively on st, second order order expectations give more
weight to the exchange rate than simple average expectations. It is easy to see
that third order expectations give more weight to the exchange rate than second
order expectations, and so on. For third order expectations, using (36) one period
ahead, we have:
E
3
txt+2 = E
2
txt+2 + ku(EtEt+1ut+1 − Etut+1)( 4 1 )
where from Lemma 1
Et(Et+1ut+1) − Etut+1 = ku,1(Etut − ut)( 4 2 )
Here ku,1 is a matrix with the coeﬃcients on vi
t of Ei
t+1ut+1.
D Solution method with two-period overlapping
investors
This method is related to Townsend (1983, section VIII). We start with the con-
jectured equation (12) for st a n dc h e c kw h e t h e ri ti sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h em o d e l ,
in particular with equation (6). For this, we need to estimate the conditional mo-
ments of st+1 and express them as a function of the model’s innovations. Finally
we equate the parameters from the resulting equation to the initially conjectured
equation.
D.1 The exchange rate equation
From (2), (1), and the deﬁnition of ft,i ti se a s yt os e et h a ti∗
t − it =( ft − st)/α.
Thus, (6) gives (for a constant σ2
t):
st =
α
1+α
E(st+1)+
ft
1+α
−
α
1+α
γbtσ
2 (43)
We want to express (43) in terms of current and past innovations. First, we have
ft = D(L)εu
t−T,w h e r eD(L)=d1+d2L+d3L+... is given by (11) and the deﬁnition
of ut,w i t hds =( 1− ρs)/(1 − ρ). Second, using (5) we can write bt = C(L)εb
t,
where C(L)=1+ρbL+ρ2
bL2+.... What remains to be computed are E(st+1)a n d
σ2.
30Applying (12) to st+1, decomposing A(L)a n dB(L), we have
st+1 = a1ε
u
t+1 + b1ε
b
t+1 + θ
0ξt + A
∗(L)ε
u
t−T + B
∗(L)ε
b
t−T (44)
where ξ0
t =( εu
t,...,εu
t−T+1,εb
t,...,εb
t−T+1) represents the vector of unobservable in-
novations, θ0 =( a2,a 3,...,a T+1,b 2,...,bT+1)a n dA∗(L)=aT+2 + aT+3L + ...(with
as i m i l a rd e ﬁnition for B∗(L) ) . T h u s ,w eh a v e( s i n c eεu
j and εb
j are known for
j ≤ t − T):
E
i
t(st+1)=θ
0E
i
t(ξt)+A
∗(L)ε
u
t−T + B
∗(L)ε
b
t−T (45)
σ
2 = vart(st+1)=a
2
1σ
2
u + b
2
1σ
2
b + θ
0vart(ξt)θ (46)
We need to estimate the conditional expectation and variance of the unobserv-
able ξt as a function of past innovations.
D.2 Conditional moments
We follow the strategy of Townsend (1983, p.556), but use the notation of Hamilton
[1994, chapter 13]. First, we subtract the known components from the observables
st and vi
t and deﬁne these new variables as s∗
t and vi∗
t . Let the vector of these
observables be Yi
t =
³
s∗
t,s ∗
t−1,...,s∗
t−T+1,vi∗
t ,...,vi∗
t−T+1
´
. From (44) and (10), we
can write:
Y
i
t = H
0ξt + w
i
t (47)
where wi
t =( 0 ,...,0,εvi
t ,...,εvi
t−T+1)0 and
H0 =

                

a1 a2 ... aT b1 b2 ... bT
0 a1 ... aT−1 0 b1 ... bT−1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
00 ... a1 00... b1
d1 d2 ... dT 00... 0
0 d1 ... dT−1 00... 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
000 d1 00... 0

                

The unconditional means of ξt and wi
t are zero. Deﬁne their unconditional
variances as e P and R. Then we have (applying eqs. (17) and (18) in Townsend):
E
i
t(ξt)=MY
i
t (48)
31where:
M=e PH
h
H
0 e PH + R
i−1
(49)
Moreover, P ≡ vart(ξt)i sg i v e nb y :
P=e P − MH
0 e P (50)
D.3 Solution
First, σ2 can easily be derived from (46) and (50). Second, substituting (48) and
(47) into (45), and averaging over investors, gives the average expectation in terms
of innovations:
Et(st+1)=θ
0MH
0ξt + A
∗(L)ε
u
t−T + B
∗(L)ε
b
t−T
W ec a nt h e ns u b s t i t u t eEt(st+1)a n dσ2 into ( 43) so that we have an expression
for st that has the same form as (12). We then need to solve a ﬁxed point problem.
Although A(L)and B(L)a r ei n ﬁnite lag operators, we only need to solve a
ﬁnitely dimensional ﬁxed point problem in the set of parameters (a1,a 2,...,aT,b 1,...,bT+1).
This can be seen as follows. First, it is easily veriﬁed by equating the parameters
of the conjectured and equilibrium exchange rate equation for lags T and greater
that bT+s+1 = 1+α
α bT+s + γσ2ρ
T+s−1
b and aT+s+1 = 1+α
α aT+s − 1
αds for s ≥ 1. As-
suming non-explosive coeﬃcients, the solutions to these diﬀerence equations give
us the coeﬃcients for lags T + 1 and greater: bT+1 = −αγσ2ρT
b /(1 + α − αρb),
bT+s =( ρb)s−1bT+1 for s ≥ 2, aT+1 = 1+α
1+α−ρ,a n daT+s+1 = 1+α
α aT+s − 1
αds for
s ≥ 1.
The ﬁxed point problem in the parameters (a1,a 2,...,a T,b 1,...,bT+1)c o n s i s t so f
2T +1 equations. One of them is the bT+1 = −αγσ2ρT
b /(1+α−αρb). The other 2T
equations equate the parameters of the conjectured and equilibrium exchange rate
equations up to lag T − 1. The conjectured parameters (a1,a 2,...,aT,b 1,...,b T+1),
together with the solution for aT+1 above allow us to compute θ, H, M and σ2,
and therefore the parameters of the equilibrium exchange rate equation. We use
the Gauss NLSYS routine to solve the 2T +1 non-linear equations. A method that
w o r k sa sw e l l( a n di sm o r ee ﬃcient for large T) is to assume starting values for
these parameters, map them into a new set of parameters by solving the equilib-
rium exchange rate equation, and continue this process until it converges, which
is usually the case.
32E S o l u t i o nm e t h o dw i t hi n ﬁnite-horizon investors
We now describe the method for solving the equilibrium exchange rate in the model
with inﬁnite-horizon investors. Asset demand, which follows from the maximiza-
tion problem (13)-(14), is more complex than in the two-period case. In particular,
investors hedge uncertainty about changes in expected future returns. Our solu-
tion method is approximate, based on truncating information after T periods. We
proceed in six steps: i) we conjecture an exchange rate equation; ii) we derive the
expectations of ut and bt with a Kalman ﬁlter, using the conjectured exchange
rate equation; iii) we compute the asset demand based on these expectations; iv)
we ﬁnd the equilibrium exchange rate that clears the foreign exchange market; v)
we discuss the numerical method used to equate the conjectured exchange rate
equation to the one that solves the foreign exchange market equilibrium; vi) we
report some numerical results for the benchmark parameterization and compare it
to the two-period model.
E.1 The exchange rate equation
We conjecture the following equilibrium exchange rate equation
st = λsst−1 + λfft + λuut + λbbt (51)
Our solution method relies on truncating at suﬃciently large lags T,s ot h a t
st−1 =( st−1,s t−2,...,st−T)
0 λs =( λ
1
s,λ
2
s,...,λ
T
s )
ft =( ft,f t−1,f t−2,...,f t−T)
0 λf =( λ
0
f,λ
1
f,...,λ
T
f )
ut =( ut,u t−1,u t−2,...,ut−T+1)
0 λu =( λ
0
u,λ
1
u,...,λ
T−1
u )
There are only T − 1l a g sf o rut since ut−T = ft after T periods.
E.2 Kalman Filter
We adopt a notation similar to Hamilton [1994, chapter 13]. Similarly to the
two-period case, let Yi
t be a vector of observable variables (present and past) for
investor i and ξt be a vector of unobservables. The components of these vectors
33are however diﬀerent than in the two-period model. The objective is to determine
the estimate of unobservables based on a linear combination of observables, i.e.,
Ei
t(ξt)=AY
i
t. In this case, the vectors of observables and unknowns are
Y
i
t =
³
st,f t,v
i
t,s t−1,f t−1,v
i
t−1,...,st−T,f t−T,v
i
t−T
´0
ξt =( ut,u t−1,...,ut−T,b t)
0
We use the following linear state-pace representation:
ZY
i
t = H
0ξt + w
i
t (52)
ξt = Fξt−1 + εt (53)
where
w
i
t =( 0 ,0,ε
v,i
t )
0 εt =( ε
u
t,0,...,0,ε
b
t)
0
Z =

 

1 −λ0
f 0 −λ1
s −λ1
f 0 λ2
s λ2
f 0 ... ... bT
s bT
f 0
0100 00 00 0 ... ... 00 0
0010 00 00 0 ... ... 00 0

 

H
0 =

 

λ0
u λ1
u λ2
u ... λu
T−1 0 λb
000 ... 01 0
100 ... 00 0

 
 F =

          

1+ρ −ρ 0 ... 000
10 0 ... 000
01 0 ... 000
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
00 0 ... 100
00 0 ... 00ρb

          

The ﬁrst row of (52) represents the exchange rate equation (51), the second row
ut−T = ft, and the third row the private signal (10).
We also deﬁne the variance-covariance matrices:
R ≡ var(w
i
t)=

 

00 0
00 0
00σ2
v

 
 Q ≡ var(εt)=

       

σ2
v 0 ... 00
00 ... 00
... ... ... ... ...
00 ... 00
00 ... 0 σ2
b

       

Deﬁne the conditional variance-covariance matrices of ξt in the steady state as
P = var(ξt|It)a n de P = var(ξt|It−1), where It and It−1 represent the information
available at t and t − 1. From Hamilton eq. (13.2.15), we have:
E
i
t(ξt)=E
i
t−1(ξt)+M
h
ZY
i
t − H
0E
i
t−1(ξt)
i
(54)
34where M and P are deﬁned by (49) and (50) and:
e P = FPF
0 + Q (55)
We need to solve for the matrix A in Ei
t(ξt)=AY
i
t.U s i n g Ei
t−1(ξt)=
FEi
t−1(ξt−1) from (53), (54) gives:
AY
i
t = FAY
i
t−1 + MZY
i
t − MH
0FAY
i
t−1 =
MZY
i
t +[ FA − MH
0FA]Y
i
t−1 (56)
We set T suﬃciently large such that the last 3 columns of A are negligible
(less that 10−5). Thus, we can set the last 3 elements of Yi
t−1 to zero in the above
equation. Deﬁne f Yi
t−1 as Yi
t−1 with the last 3 elements set equal to zero. We then
deﬁne a transformation matrix U such that f Yi
t−1 = UY
i
t,s ot h a t( 5 6 )i m p l i e s :
A = MZ + FAU − MH
0FAU (57)
The matrices P, ˜ P and A can be solved from (50), (55) and (57) for a given
exchange rate equation.
E.3 Optimal asset demand
The analysis here draws on Wang [1994, Appendix A]. Investor i maximizes (13)
subject to (14). The Bellman equation is
U
i
t =m a x
n
−e
−γci
t + βEtU
i
t+1
o
where the maximization is done with respect to ci
t and bi
t. We conjecture that the
value function is:
U
i
t = −α1 exp
½
−α2w
i
t −
1
2
Y
i
tVY
i0
t
¾
(58)
Deﬁne the excess return on foreign bonds as qt+1 = st+1 −st +i∗
t −it. Then using
(14) we have:
U
i
t+1 = −α1 exp
½
−α2(1 + it)w
i
t + α2c
i
t − α2[f(˜ m
i
t) − it ˜ m
i
t] − α2b
i
tqt+1 −
1
2
Y
i
t+1VY
i0
t+1
¾
(59)
35Maximization over ˜ mi
t gives f0(˜ mi
t)=it, which leads to the same aggregate money
demand function as before. Since it = r is constant, the term −α2[f(˜ mi
t) − it ˜ mi
t]
is a constant, which we will denote K below.
We now want to express the last two terms of (59) as a function of current
observables Yi
t.U s i n gi∗
t − it =( ft − st)/α,w eg e t :
qt+1 = st+1 −
1+α
α
st +
ft
α
(60)
We can then use (51) to substitute for st+1. We decompose qt+1 into expected and
unexpected components. Let us deﬁne the vector of shocks ²i
t+1 =( εu
t+1,εvi
t+1,εb
t+1, e ξt−
Ei
t(e ξt))0 and e ξt =( ut,u t−1,...,ut−T+1)0. After a few substitutions we get:
qt+1 = Θ
0
1Y
i
t + Θ
0
2E
i
t(ξt)+Θ
0
3²
i
t+1 (61)
Since Ei
t(ξt)=AY
i
t,w eg e t :
qt+1 = Θ
0Y
i
t + Θ
0
3²
i
t+1 (62)
where Θ ≡ Θ1 + A0Θ2.
Similarly to qt+1 we can express st+1, ft+1,a n dvi
t+1 as functions of Yi
t and ²i
t+1.
This allows us to express Yi
t+1 in terms of Yi
t and ²i
t+1:
Y
i
t+1 = N1Y
i
t + N2²
i
t+1
We can then rewrite (59) as:
U
i
t+1 = −α1 exp



−α2(1 + it)wi
t + α2ci
t − α2bi
tΘ0Yi
t − 1
2Yi0
t N0
1VN1Y
i
t
−α2bi
tΘ0
3²i
t+1 − Yi0
t N0
1VN2²
i
t+1 − 1
2²0
t+1N0
2VN2²
i
t+1 + K



(63)
Using the normality of the random variables in ²i
t+1:
E
i
t(U
i
t+1)=
−α1
|Σ|
1
2 |Ω|
−1
2
exp

  
  
−α2(1 + it)wi
t + α2ci
t − α2bi
tΘ0Yi
t − 1
2Yi0
t N0
1VN1Y
i
t
+1
2α2
2bi2
t Θ0
3ΩΘ3 + Yi0
t N0
1VN2ΩN0
2V
0N1Yi
t
+2α2bi
tΘ0
3ΩN0
2V
0N1Yi
t + K

  
  
(64)
where Σ = var(²i
t+1)a n dΩ =[ Σ−1 + N0
2VN2]
−1. Maximizing this expression with
respect to bi
t,w eg e t
b
i
t =
h
Θ0 − Θ0
3ΩN0
2V
0N1
i
Yi
t
α2Θ0
3ΩΘ3
(65)
36The ﬁrst term in brackets represents the expected return, while the second term
represents the hedge against expected return changes.
After maximizing the Bellman equation with respect to ci
t and substituting the
result back into the Bellman equation, it is easily veriﬁed that our conjecture of
the value function (59) is correct if α2 = γr and
V =
1
1+r
Ã
(Θ − N0
1VN2Ω0Θ3)(Θ0 − Θ0
3ΩN0
2VN1)
Θ0
3ΩΘ3
+ N
0
1VN1 − N
0
1VN2ΩN
0
2V
0N1
!
(66)
This contains an implicit solution for V.
E.4 Foreign exchange market equilibrium
Foreign exchange market equilibrium implies
R 1
0 bi
t = bt,w h e r ebt is total supply
associated with non-fundamentals based trade. Aggregating (65), this implies
α2Θ
0
3ΩΘ3bt = ω
0Yt (67)
where Yt is the average Yi
t (i.e., vi
t,v i
t−1,.. are replaced by ut,u t−1,...)a n dt h e
vector ω is deﬁned as:
ω = Θ − N
0
1VN2ΩΘ3.
Equation (67) can be solved for the equilibrium exchange rate:
st = λ
0
sst−1 + λ
0
fft + λ
0
uut + λ
0
bbt (68)
with the parameters a function of α2Θ0
3ΩΘ3 and ω.
E.5 Numerical Solution
In order to solve for the exchange rate equation, we need to simultaneously solve
for the matrices A, P, e P, V, the vectors λf, λu, λs,a n dλb. T h i si sd o n ea s
follows. For a given V we solve for all the other parameters with the Gauss non-
linear equation system routine NLSYS. The equations solved are (50), (55), (57),
λf = λ0
f, λs = λ0
s, λu = λ0
u and λb = λ0
b. We start with V = 0 and solve for the
other parameters. Given the other parameters we then solve for V using (66). The
37solution to (66) is found as follows. We ﬁrst set V = 0 on the right hand side.
The expression then gives us a new V on the left hand side. We then substitute
this on the right hand side, and so on, until it converges to the solution. Once we
obtain the solution of V to (66), we use the NLSYS routine to solve again for the
other parameters. After that we compute a new V from (66), and so on, until the
process converges (with changes in parameters becoming negligibly small from one
iteration to the next).
E.6 Inﬁnite Horizon Results
The results for the inﬁnite horizon model are practically identical to those for the
overlapping generations model. In order to illustrate this, we report some results
based on the benchmark parameterization. Two points need to be made about
parameter choices. First, the γ in the inﬁnite horizon model is not exactly the same
as the γ in the overlapping generations model. In the inﬁnite horizon model α2 =
γr is the rate of absolute risk-aversion with respect to wealth, which is comparable
to the absolute risk-aversion parameter γ in the overlapping generations model.
We therefore set α2 to the same value as γ in the overlapping generations model.
Second, a solution to (66) requires us to set the real interest rate r.W es e ti ta t
0.01, although results are not sensitive to this.
The magniﬁcation factor of the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate is
7.2328 for the overlapping generations model and 7.3225 for the inﬁnite horizons
model. The contribution of b-shocks to var(st+1−st) is 69.37% for the overlapping
generations model and 68.67% for the inﬁnite horizon model. Finally, the half-
life of the impact of b-shocks on the exchange rate is 2.9522 for the overlapping
generations model and 2.9275 for the inﬁnite horizon model.
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43Benchmark
parameterization
σb 0.01
σv 0.08
σu 0.01
ρ 0
ρb 0.8
α 10
γ 500
T 8
Table 1: Parameterization
440
4
8
12
16
20
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel A  Magnification Factor
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Panel B  Relative weight x=λ u/λ b
Figure 1  Magnification and relative weight x in model without infinite 
regress*
Function of σ v
Function of σ b
σ v and σ b σ v and σ b
Function of σ b
Function of σ v
*These figures are based on the simulation of the model for T=1, ρ 1= ρ 2=ρ b=0. The qualitative results do not depend on other model parameters. We 
set α =10, γ =50, and all standard deviations of the shocks equal to 0.1, unless varied within the Figure.0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
02468 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 Time
Panel A  Impulse Response Functions in Heterogeneous Information Model 
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0 2 4 6 8 1 01 21 41 61 8 k
Panel B  Impulse Response Functions in Common Knowledge Model 
Panel D  R2 of regression of st+k-st on current and 
lagged fundamentals 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
13579 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 7 1 9 k
Figure 2 Results for the Benchmark Parameterization*
* See Table 1.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
13579 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 7 1 9 k
Panel C  Percent contribution b-shocks to var(st+k-st)
u-shock
b-shock
u-shock
ε v-shock
b-shock
Heterogeneous information model
Common knowledge model 
Heterogeneous information 
model
Common knowledge model0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 k
Panel E  R2 of regression of ft+k-ft+1 on st+1-st.
Figure 2 Results for the Benchmark Parameterization-continued.0
2
4
6
8
10
0.01 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel A  Impact of σ v
Figure 3   Sensitivity Analysis*
magnification
contribution 
(right scale)
half-life b-shocks
* Contribution = the percentage of var(st+1-st) contributed by non-fundamental shocks (b-shocks). It is measured in percentage terms on the right        
scale. Magnification = factor by which information dispersion amplifies the exchange rate response to b-shocks (measured on the left scale). Half 
life = number of periods after which the impact of a b-shock on the exchange rate is reduced by half relative to the initial impact (measured on the 
left scale).
0
6
12
18
24
30
0.0000 0.0060 0.0110 0.0160 0.0210 0.0260
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel B  Impact of σ b
magnification 
contribution 
(right scale)
half-life b-shocks
σ v σ b
ρ b σ u
0
3
6
9
12
15
0.005 0.015 0.025 0.035 0.045
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0
4
8
12
16
0.600 0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel D Impact of σ u Panel C Impact of ρ b
contribution 
(right scale)
magnification
half-life b-shocks
contribution 
(right scale)
magnification
Half-life b-shocks0
2
4
6
8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel E  Impact of ρ
Figure 3   Sensitivity Analysis-continued*
magnification
contribution 
(right scale)
half-life b-shocks
* Contribution = the percentage of var(st+1-st) contributed by non-fundamental shocks (b-shocks). It is measured in percentage terms on the right        
scale. Magnification = factor by which information dispersion amplifies the exchange rate response to b-shocks (measured on the left scale). Half 
life = number of periods after which the impact of a b-shock on the exchange rate is reduced by half relative to the initial impact (measured on the 
left scale).
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
2468 1 0 1 2 1 4 1 6 1 8 2 0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel G Impact of α
magnification
contribution 
(right scale)
half-life b-shocks
α
ρ
0
3
6
9
12
15
2468 1 0 1 2 1 4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Panel F  Impact of T
T
contribution 
(right scale)
magnification
half-life b-shocks